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Waggoner:

WITH MARRIAGE ON THE DECLINE AND COHABITATION
ON THE RISE, WHAT ABOUT MARITAL RIGHTS
FOR UNMARRIED PARTNERS?
41 ACTEC L.J. (pts. 1 & 2) (forthcoming Jan. & Feb. 2016) *

Lawrence W. Waggoner**
Part I of this paper uses recent government data to trace
the decline of marriage and the rise of cohabitation in the
United States. Between 2000 and 2010, the population grew
by 9.71%, but the husband and wife households only grew by
3.7%, while the unmarried couple households grew by 41.4%.
A counter-intuitive finding is that the early 21st century data
show little correlation between the marriage rate and
economic conditions.
Because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges (2015), same-sex marriage is now universally
available to same-sex couples. Part I considers the impact of
same-sex marriage on the marriage rate. Part I then
describes the benefits and obligations of marriage and closes
by noting the demographic characteristics of cohabiting
couples. The paper points out that cohabitation is a
temporary or short-term state in most cases: The parties
either break up or get married fairly quickly. Nevertheless, a
small percentage of cohabiting couples continue to cohabit
for much longer or for life. Because more are added every
year, these cohabitations accumulate in the population.
Part II discusses how the case law has addressed the
rights and obligations of cohabiting couples when they break
up. Titled From Contract to Status, this Part starts with the
enforcement of contracts between the parties, then moves to
the right of plaintiffs when they do not allege or cannot prove
a contract. One route to recovery would be common-law
marriage, but that concept was abolished by late-19th century

*
A shorter version of this article will appear in a symposium on cohabitation
published in the Summer 2016 issue of the Family Law Quarterly.
**
Lewis M. Simes Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan. For
commenting on earlier drafts, I thank David Chambers, Bruce Frier, and John
Langbein.
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statutes in almost every American jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
in states that have abolished common-law marriage, cases
exist in which the court awarded damages to the plaintiff
based on status, i.e., in which the court described the couple’s
relationship as a marriage in all but name.
Part III argues the case for treating cohabiting couples
whose relationship shows that they are (or were) deeply
committed to one another as married in fact. The paper finds
that a consensus of sorts has quietly emerged in legislation to
this effect that has been enacted or introduced in the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. In this
country, the American Law Institute (ALI) has recognized that
longer-term cohabitants have rights similar to married
couples upon dissolution of the relationship. Drawing on the
UK and Commonwealth statutes, the ALI proposal, and the
case law described in Part II, the paper presents for
discussion a draft De Facto Marriage Act. The Draft Act,
however, along with the Commonwealth statutes and the ALI
proposal, does not, and probably should not, provide a
mechanism for automatically declaring a couple as married
in fact. Couples who deliberately decline to marry should not
have their decision overridden. Consequently, the Draft Act
is not set up to be self-executing. A court judgment is
required.
The paper concludes by pointing out that a de facto
marriage judgment would qualify a couple for all federal as
well as state benefits and obligations of marriage.
I. Introduction: Marriage and Cohabitation Rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. The Decline of Marriage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. The Rise of Cohabitation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
C. Impact of Same-Sex Marriage on the Marriage Rate. . . . . 11
D. The Benefits, Rights, and Obligation of Marriage. . . . . . . 13
E. Longer-Term Cohabitations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
II. Case Law: From Contract to Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A. Recovery Based on Contract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B. Recovery Based on Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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1. Common-Law Marriage.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2. In States that Have Abolished Common-Law
Marriage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
III. A Uniform De Facto Marriage Act?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
IV. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

I. INTRODUCTION:
MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION RATES
A. The Decline of Marriage
Between 1867 and 1967, the annual marriage rate changed little:
0.96% of the population married in 1867 and 0.97% in 1967. In the
intervening years, the rated dipped as low as 0.79% during the Great
Depression in 1932 and spiked up to 1.46% when the troops came
home after the end of World War II. The annual percentage during
ninety of these years ranged between 0.85% and 1.14%.1
By 2000, the marriage rate had declined to 0.82%. The rate
continued to spiral downward, reaching an historic low of slightly
less than 0.68% in 2009. From 2009 to 2012, the latest years for
which marriage-rate statistics are available, the marriage rate
stabilized at that historically low rate of slightly less than 0.68%:2

1

See PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, 100 Years of Marriage and Divorce Statistics United States, 1867-1967,
at 7 (DHEW Pub. No. (HRA) 74-1902, Dec. 1973), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_21/sr21_024.pdf.
2
Demographic Intelligence, a consulting firm that claims that its demographic
forecasts are 99% accurate, predicts: “The United State marriage rate is . . . is
poised to go lower . . . .” DEMOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE, United States Marriage
Rate, at Century Low, Headed Down, at 1 (May 15, 2015), available at
http://www.demographicintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/US_Wedding_P
R_5.15.15.pdf.
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Table 1
Number of Marriages, Marriage and Unemployment Rates. Gross
Domestic Product: 2000-20123
Year

Number of
Marriages

Population

Percentage
of the
Population
Getting
Married

Unemployment Rate
of Those
Seeking
Employment4

Gross
Domestic
Product in
Billions of
Chained
2009
Dollars5

2000

2,315,000

281,421,906

0.82261

4.0%

$12,559.7

2001

2,326,000

284,968,955

0.81623

4.7%

$12,682.2

2002

2,290,000

287,625,193

0.79618

5.8%

$12,908.8

2003

2,245,000

290,107,933

0.77385

6.0%

$13,271.1

2004

2,279,000

292,805,298

0.77833

5.5%

$13,773.5

2005

2,249,000

295,516,599

0.76104

5.1%

$14,234.2

2006

2,193,000

294,077,247

0.74572

4.6%

$14,613.8

(excludes
Louisiana)

2007

2,197,000

301,231,207

0.72934

4.6%

$14,873.7

2008

2,157,000

304,093,966

0.70932

5.8%

$14,830.4

2009

2,080,000

306,771,529

0.67803

9.3%

$14,418.7

2010

2,096,000

308,745,538

0.67888

9.6%

$14,738.8

2011

2,118,000

311,591,917

0.67974

8.9%

$15,020.6

2012

2,131,000

313,914,040

0.67885

8.1%

$15,354.6

3

The first four columns are based on the 2000-2012 marriage-rate table in
NAT’L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, National
Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, at 1 (Feb. 19, 2015), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm. See also Isabel V.
Sawhill, Beyond Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2014, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/opinion/sunday/beyond-marriage.html?_r=1
(“Marriage is disappearing.”).
4
See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Labor Force Statistics, available at
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04000000?years_option=all_years&periods_o
ption=specific_periods&periods=Annual+Data.
5
See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, National Economic Accounts, Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), available at http://bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp.
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Although the marriage rate dipped substantially during the Great
Depression of the 1930s, a counter-intuitive finding is that the early
21st century data in Table 1 show little correlation between the
marriage rate and economic conditions. The marriage rate was
declining long before the 2008-09 recession and declined at only a
slightly accelerated pace during the second year of that recession. Just
as the 2009-2012 marriage rate stabilized, the unemployment rate
spiked up from below 6.0% to over 9.0% despite improvement in the
gross domestic product. These data points do not mean that a
dramatically improved economy sometime in the future might not
correlate with a rising marriage rate, but that cannot now be known.
So far though, current data show that the 2015 unemployment rate for
those in the likely first-marriage ages—the millennials (18- to 34year-olds)—is down to 7.7%, but that has not led them to form more
households than they did before the recession began.6
Analyzing U.S. Census data, the Pew Research Center found that
“[i]n 1960, 72% of all adults age 18 and older were married; [in
2010,] just 51% are.”7 The Center also found that “just 20% of adults
ages 18 to 29 are married, compared with 59% in 1960, [though it] is
not yet known whether today’s young adults are abandoning marriage
or merely delaying it.”8 The Center also found that “[p]ublic opinion
about marriage echoes the declining prevalence of marriage. In a
2010 Pew Research Center survey, about four-in-ten Americans
(39%) said they agree that marriage as an institution is becoming

6

See Richard Fry, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, More Millennial Living With
Family Despite Improved Job Market, at 2 (July 29, 2015), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/07/29/more-millennials-living-with-family
-despite-improved-job-market/.
7
D’Vera Cohn et al., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Barely Half of U.S. Adults Are
Married—A Record Low, at 1 (Dec. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/12/14/barely-half-of-u-s-adults-are-marrie
d-a-record-low/ [hereinafter Pew: Less than Half Are Married]. See also PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families, at 1 (Paul
Taylor
ed.
Nov.
18,
2010),
available
at
http://www.pewresearch.org/pubs/1802/decline-marriage-rise-new-families (“About
half [52%] of all adults in this country were married in 2008; back in 1960, sevenin-ten [72%] were.”) [hereinafter Pew: The Decline of Marriage & Rise of New
Families].
8
Pew: Less than Half Are Married, supra note 7, at 2.
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obsolete. Back in the 70s, only 28% agreed with that premise....
However, attitudes toward the institution of marriage do not always
match personal wishes about getting married. Asked whether they
want to get married, 47% of unmarried adults who agree that
marriage is becoming obsolete say that they would like to wed.”9

B. The Rise of Cohabitation
As the marriage rate has declined, the cohabitation rate has
risen.10 According to the latest Census Bureau report, “the unmarried
partner population numbered 7.7 million in 2010 and grew 41%
between 2000 and 2010.”11

9

Id. at 6.
See INSTITUTE FOR AM. VALUES & UNIV. OF VA. NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT,
THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 2012 (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA], at 64 (“The decline in marriage does not mean that people
are giving up on living together with a sexual partner. On the contrary, with the
incidence of unmarried cohabitation increasing rapidly, marriage is giving ground
to unwed unions.”), 76 (“For many, cohabitation is a prelude to marriage, for others
simply an alternative to living alone, and for a small but growing number it is
considered an alternative to marriage.”), available at
http://stateofourunions.org/2012/SOOU2012.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MarriedCouple and Unmarried Partner Households: 2000, at 1 (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf; Pew: The Decline of Marriage
& Rise of New Families, supra note 4, at 66-67; DEMOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE,
supra note 2, at 2 (“Cohabitation has emerged as a competitor to marriage, insofar
as it offers intimacy and the opportunity to have children without requiring the same
level of commitment.”). See also Pew: Less than Half Are Married, supra note 4,
at 1;
11
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Households and Families: 2010, at 3 (April
2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf.
10
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Table 2
Households by Type: 2000 and 2010 12
Household Type

2000

2010

Number

Number

Percent of
All Households13

Percent of
All Households

Change in
Numbers, 2000 to
2010
Number
Percent
Change

Husband and Wife
Family Households14
With Own Children15
Without Own Children

54,493,232

51.0

56,510,377

48.4

+2,017,145

3.7

24,835,505
29,657,727

23.5
28.1

23,588,377
32,922,268

20.2
28.2

-1,247,237

+3,246,382

-5.0
11.0

Unmarried Couple
Households:
Opposite-Sex Partner
Same-Sex partner

5,475,768

5.2

7,744,711

6.6

+2,268,943

41.4

4,881,377
594,391

4.6
0.6

6,842,714
901,997

5.9
0.8

+1,961,337
+307,606

40.2
51.8

In 2000, husband and wife households represented 51% of all
households and 76% of family households.16 By 2010, though, the
number of husband and wife households increased by 4.7%, but
dropped to 48% of all households and 73% of family households.17
Unmarried couple households represented 5.2% of all households
in 2000 and increased to 6.6% of all households by 2010. In 2000,
opposite-sex partner households represented 4.6% of all households
and 89% of unmarried-couple households.18 By 2010, opposite-sex
partner household rose by 40% in numbers and to 5.9% of all
households and 88% of unmarried-couple households.19 Same-sex
partner households represented 0.6% of all households and 11% of
unmarried-partner households in 2000.20 By 2010, the number of
same-sex partner households rose by 52% and to 0.8% of all

12

Adapted from id. tbl. 2, at 3.
The Census Bureau defines a “household” as consisting of “all of the people
who occupy a housing unit.” Id. at 2.
14
The Census Bureau defines a “family household” as a household that consists
of “a householder and one or more other people living in the same household who
are related to the householder by birth, marriage, or adoption.” Id. at 2.
15
The Census Bureau defines “own children” as consisting of “biological,
adopted, and stepchildren of the householder who are under 18.” Id.
16
See id. tbl. 2, at 3.
17
See id.
18
See id.
19
See id.
20
See id.
13
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households; they remained stable at 11% of unmarried-partner
households.21

As illustrated by Figure 1, the population grew by 9.71% between
2000 and 2010. By contrast, the husband and wife households only
grew by 3.7%, but the unmarried couple households grew by 41.4%.
The husband and wife households also declined as a percentage of all
households and of family households.22 Unmarried couple
households, opposite-sex partner households, and same-sex partner
households rose in both numbers and percentages of all households.

21

See id.
For the Census Bureau’s definitions of “household” and “family household,”
see supra notes 14 & 15.
22
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Figure 2 pictures the degree to which opposite-sex partner
households outnumber same-sex partner households.23 Although the
ratio dropped from 8.2 to 1 in 2000 to 7.6 to 1 in 2010, the ratio
should widen as a certain percentage of same-sex couples shift to
marriage.
Children are present in many unmarried couple households. In a
report by a group of family scholars, the authors noted:
In the latter half of the twentieth century, divorce posed the biggest
threat to marriage in the United States.... No More.... Today, the
rise of cohabiting households with children is the largest
unrecognized threat to the quality and stability of children’s family
lives.... Now, approximately 24 percent of the nation’s children are

23

For more statistics, see Unmarried Equality, available at
http://www.unmarried.org/statistics/. Unmarried Equality, formerly known as The
Alternatives to Marriage Project, is an advocacy group for rights of the unmarried.
According to their mission statement, “Unmarried Equality (UE) advocates for
equality and fairness for unmarried people, including people who are single, choose
not to marry, cannot marry, or live together before marriage.... Unmarried Equality
is not opposed to marriage. But we believe that unmarried relationships also deserve
validation and support.” Unmarried Equality Mission Statement, available at
http://www.unmarried.org/about-us/.
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born to cohabiting couples, which means that more children are
currently born to cohabiting couples than to single mothers.24

Of all households counted in the 2010 census, 5.9% were
unmarried opposite-sex couple households and 2.3% were unmarried
opposite-sex couple households with own children.25 Unmarried
same-sex couple households made up 0.6% of all households, and
those with own children 0.1%.26 Stated another way, 39% of
unmarried opposite-sex couple households had own children present
and 17% of unmarried same-sex couple households had own children
present.27

24

W. BRADFORD WILCOX ET AL., WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS 6 (3d ed. 2011).
See also CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART 169 (1st paperback ed. 2013) (“If you
are interested in the welfare of children. knowing that the child was born to a
cohabiting woman instead of a lone unmarried woman should have little effect on
your appraisal of the child’s chances in life.”); Wendy D. Manning, Cohabitation
and Child Wellbeing, 25 MARRIAGE AND CHILD WELL BEING 51 (Fall 2015),
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
a
t
http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/Cohabitation.pdf ("On
the other hand, stable cohabiting families with two biological parents seem to offer
many of the same health, cognitive, and behavioral benefits that stable married
biological parent families provide.").
25
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Households and Families: 2010, tbl.3, at 8 (April
2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf.
26
See id.
27
By another count, 19% of same-sex couples are raising biological, step, or
adopted children. See Gary J. Gates, The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law,
LGBT Parenting in the United States (Feb. 2013), available at
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf.
There is a vast literature on children of same-sex couples. See, e.g., Catherine
Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
1589 (2013); Courtney G. Joplin, Searching for Harm: Same-Sex Marriage and the
Well-Being of Children, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81 (2011); Jennifer L. Rosato,
Children of Same-Sex Parents Deserve the Security Blanket of the Parentage
Presumption, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 74 (2006); Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little
Children: Justifying Same-Sex Marriage from the Perspective of a Child of the
Union, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 411 (1999); Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of All
Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage Both Miss the Mark,
8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573 (2005); Sam Castic, The Irrationality of a Rational Basis:
Denying Benefits to the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 3 MOD. AM. 3 (2007).
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C. Impact of Same-Sex Marriage on the Marriage Rate
The Supreme Court has now spoken. In Obergefell v. Hodges,28
the Court held that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to
marry, saying:
[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty
of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now
holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to
marry.29

A Gallup Poll taken shortly before the Supreme Court decided
Obergefell found that 60% of Americans support legalization of
same-sex marriage; that figure is up from 55% in 2014 and is the
highest approval that Gallup has found on the question.30 One
demographer found “no evidence that allowing same-sex couples to
marry reduces the opposite-sex marriage rate.”31
Before Obergefell, same-sex marriage was legal in thirty-seven
states and the District of Columbia.32 The movement toward

28

576 U.S.___, Slip Opinion No. 14-556 (June 26, 2015).
Id. at 22. In Davis v. Miller (Aug. 31, 2015), No. 15A250, the Court denied
a petition by a Kentucky county clerk to be allowed to refuse to issue marriage
licenses on the ground of her religious beliefs against same-sex marriage.
30
See Justin McCarthy, GALLUP, Record-High 60% of Americans Support
Same-Sex Marriage, (May 18, 2015), available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/183272/record-high-americans-support-sex-marriage
.aspx?utm_source=Social%20Issues&utm_medium=newsfeed&utm_campaign=t
iles. For a similar result, see Karlyn Bowman, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE,
Public Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage: Anatomy of a Change (June 1, 2015),
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
a
t
http://www.aei.org/publication/public-opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-anatomy-o
f-a-change/.
31
Marcus Dillender, The Death of Marriage? The Effects of New Forms of
Legal Recognition on Marriage Rates in the United States, 51 DEMOGRAPHY 563,
563 (2014).
32
For an exact time line, see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
S a m e
S e x
M a r r i a g e
L a w s ,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx (last
visited July 31, 2015). Internationally, twenty countries have legalized same-sex
marriage: Ireland (2015), Finland (2015), Luxembourg (2014), Scotland (2014),
29
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legalization started with the 2003 decision of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health.33 In
twenty-five of the thirty-seven states, same-sex marriage was
legalized by state or federal judicial decision,34 eleven and the District
of Columbia by legislation,35 and one by state voter approved ballot
proposal.36 Based on Census 2010 data, the Census Bureau initially
estimated that 25.6% of same-sex partners were married, but later
issued a lower revised estimate of 20%.37 In terms of numbers, the
Census Bureau initially estimated that there were 251,695 same-sex
married couples in 2013, but later revised its estimate downward,
finding the number to be 170,429; the discrepancy was attributed to
opposite sex married couples checking the wrong gender box by
mistake on the survey questionnaire.38 Because these figures were

England and Wales (2013), Brazil (2013), France (2013), New Zealand (2013),
Uruguay (2013), Denmark (2012), Argentina (2010), Portugal (2010), Iceland
(2010), Sweden (2009), Norway (2009), South Africa (2006), Spain (2005), Canada
(2005), Belgium (2003), and The Netherlands (2000). In Mexico, Mexico City
(2009) and the states of Quintana Roo (2011) and Coahuila (2014) have legalized
same-sex marriage. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Gay Marriage Around the World
( J u n e
2 6 ,
2 0 1 5 ) ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/gay-marriage-around-the-world-2013/?ut
m_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_campaign=1e18492f80-Same_sex_deci
sion_newsletter_June_266_26_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953
b9b70-1e18492f80-399818005.
33
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
34
Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, New York, New Jersey,
Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 32.
35
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington. See id.
36
Maine. See id.
37
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Census Bureau Releases Estimates of Same-Sex
Married Couples, Sept. 27, 2011, available at
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11-cn181.html.
38
See Daphne Lofquist, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND HOUSING STATISTICS
DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Using Names to Improve Measurement of Samesex Married Couples in the American Community Survey, at 9 & tbl.4 at 15 (2015),
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
a
t
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2015/demo/2
015-Lofquist-01-Abstract.pdf. See also D’Vera Cohn, PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
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compiled when same-sex marriage was becoming more available but
not yet universally available (as it is as of June 26, 2015), the figures
might not be a reliable predictor of the long-term marriage or nonmarriage habits of same-sex partners.

D. The Benefits, Rights, and Obligations of Marriage
Marriage carries significant psychological,39 health,40 and
financial41 benefits. Marriage also creates federal and state rights,
obligations, and immunities42—including social security,43 taxation,44

How many same-sex married couples in the U.S.? Maybe 170,000 (June 24, 2015),
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
a
t
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/24/how-many-same-sex-marriedcouples-in-the-u-s-maybe-170000/?utm_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_ca
mpaign=6f9a4ee826-June_25_2015_Newsletter6_24_2015&utm_medium=emai
l&utm_term=0_3e953b9b70-6f9a4ee826-399818005.
39
See, e.g., THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, The Benefits of Marriage, Family
F a c t s . o r g . ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t
http://www.familyfacts.org/briefs/1/the-benefits-of-marriage.
40
See, e.g., id; Michael S. Rendall et al., The Protective Effect of Marriage for
Survival: A Review and Update, 48 DEMOGRAPHY 481 (2011) (“[W]e find a
consistent survival advantage for married over unmarried men and women, and an
additional survival ‘premium’ for married men.”); Andrew Hess & Glenn T.
Stanton, The Health Benefits of Marriage (Sept. 2012), available at
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about_us/focus-findings/marriage/health-bene
fits-of-marriage.aspx.
41
See, e.g., Jonathan Vespa & Matthew A. Painter II, Cohabitation History,
Marriage, and Wealth Accumulation, 48 DEMOGRAPHY 983 (2011) (“Over time,
marriage positively correlates with wealth accumulation.”); Lisen Stromberg,
What’s Love Got to Do With It? The Financial Benefits of Marriage, Money Under
30, available at http://www.moneyunder30.com/financial-benefits-of-marriage;
Nolo, Marriage Rights and Benefits, NOLO , available at
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/marriage-rights-benefits-30190.html.
42
In Obergefell, 576 U.S.___ (June 26, 2015), Slip Opinion No. 14-556, at 12,
the Supreme Court listed the benefits and obligations of marriage as including
“taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal
privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority;
adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates;
professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’ compensation
benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation rules.”
43
See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Social Security Survivor Benefits
5, available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-05-10084.pdf.
44
Joint income tax return (I.R.C. § 1(a)) and estate and gift tax marital
deduction (I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523). The income tax, however, also has marriage
penalties. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, For Better or Worse: Marriage and
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spousal-communication-and-testimonial-privileges,45 obligation of
support,46 the right to a property settlement and perhaps alimony in
divorce,47 a large intestate share for a surviving spouse,48 and
protection against disinheritance via a right to elect a forced share.49
In community property states, property acquired during marriage
other than by gift or inheritance is community property and is owned

the Federal Income Tax (June 1997), available at
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/marria
ge.pdf. The Tax Policy Center offers a Marriage Tax Calculator. See TAX POLICY
CENTER, Marriage Bonus and Penalty Tax Calculator, available at
http://taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/marriagepenaltycalculator.cfm. Obtaining a
divorce for the sole purpose of filing tax returns as unmarried individuals is
forbidden if, at the time of the divorce, the divorced individuals intend to and do
remarry in the next tax year. See I.R.S. Pub. No. 17 at 20.
45
See, e.g., CALIF. EVID. CODE § 970 (privilege not to testify against spouse);
id. § 971 (privilege not to be called as a witness against spouse).
46
See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/16.
47
See e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 552.101-.103. See generally Ira Mark
Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989).
48
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102.
A few states, by statute, bar the surviving spouse from taking for desertion or
adultery. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.090 (spouse barred if spouse “leaves the
other and lives in adultery,” unless the spouses “afterward become reconciled and
live together as husband and wife”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:19 (spouse barred
“if at the time of the death of either husband or wife, the decedent was justifiably
living apart from the surviving husband or wife because such survivor was or had
been guilty of conduct which constitutes cause for divorce”); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(5), (6) (spouse barred if spouse “abandoned the deceased
spouse, and such abandonment continued until the time of death” or if the spouse
“who, having the duty to support the other spouse, failed or refused to provide for
such spouse though he or she had the means or ability to do so, unless such marital
duty was resumed and continued until the death of the spouse having the need of
support”); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2106(a) (spouse barred “who, for one year
or upwards previous to the death of the other spouse, has wilfully neglected or
refused to perform the duty to support the other spouse, or who for one year or
upwards has wilfully and maliciously deserted the other spouse”); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-16.3A (spouse barred if spouse “wilfully deserts or abandons his or her
spouse and such desertion or abandonment continues until the death of the spouse”).
A few courts, without statutory authority to vary the rights provided to
surviving spouses, have denied claims against decedents’ estates by persons who
were lawfully married to the decedents when they died. See, e.g., Estate of Abila,
197 P.2d 10 (Cal. 1948) (wife barred because interlocutory decree of divorce,
granted to decedent before his death, terminated decedent’s obligation of support,
though it did not dissolve the marriage).
49
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-214.
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fifty-fifty by each married partner. Under Obergefell, these benefits
are now available in all states and in most and perhaps all U.S.
Territories50 to same-sex couples who decide to get married,51 not just
in the thirty-seven states in which same-sex marriage had previously
been legalized.
Pre-Obergefell, several states in which same-sex marriage was
prohibited provided mechanisms by which same-sex couples could
gain most or all state but not federal marital benefits by registering as
domestic partners or as reciprocal beneficiaries or by entering into
civil unions.52 The Census Bureau estimated that, as of 2010, 169,205

50

See Omar Gonzalez-Pagan, No Same-Sex Couple Left Behind: SCOTUS
Ruling for the Freedom to Marry would Apply with Equal Force to U.S. Territories,
A p r i l
2 4 ,
2 0 1 5 ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t
http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20150424_scotus-ruling-would-apply-to-us-ter
ritories. The five U.S. Territories are Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam,
the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Somoa. Individuals born in American
Somoa, unlike individuals born in the other four territories, are not U.S. citizens;
they are U.S. nationals. See id. The equal protection and due process clause of the
14trh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies to “citizens of the United States.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51
Regarding federal benefits, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Attorney General
Lynch Announces Federal Marriage Benefits Available to Same-Sex Couples
N a t i o n w i d e ( P r e s s R e l e a s e J ul y 9 , 2 0 1 5 ) , a v a i l a b l e a t
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-lynch-announces-federal-marriag
e-benefits-available-same-sex-couples; SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Supreme Court Decision Regarding Same-Sex Marriage (July 9, 2015), available
a
t
http://blog.socialsecurity.gov/2015/07/09/supreme-court-decision-regarding-sam
e-sex-marriage/; Rev. Rul.2013-17, I.R.B. 2013-38. Regarding state and federal
benefits, see Tara Siegel Bernard, What the Same-Sex Marriage Decision Means
for Couples’ Rights and Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2015, updated June 26,
2 0 1 5 ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/your-money/the-same-sex-marriage-decisio
n-whats-at-stake-for-couples.html?_r=0.
52
For a list of states, see NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Civil
Unions & Domestic Partn ersh ip S ta tu tes( No v. 1 8 , 20 1 4) ,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civil-unions-and-domestic-partners
hip-statutes.aspx. Some of the domestic-partner statutes allowed some or all
opposite-sex couples to register as well. For federal tax purposes, civil unions,
domestic partnerships, and other similar formal relationships are not marriages,
because state law does not “denominate [these relationships] as ... marriage[s].” See
Rev. Rul.2013-17, I.R.B. 2013-38.
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same-sex couples had done so.53 Shortly after Connecticut, Delaware,
New Hampshire, and Rhode Island legalized same-sex marriage,
those states enacted legislation that automatically converts thenexisting civil unions into marriages,54 instantly entitling the parties to
all federal and state marital benefits.55
Because marriage has now become available to all same-sex
couples and marriages in one state must now be recognized in all
states, and because of the one-time conversion to marriage of civilunion couples, the overall marriage rate is certain to rise,56 but how
substantial the long-term boost will be is hard to predict.57 The latest
data on the overall marriage-rate and for the number of unmarried
same-sex partners are for 2010.58 Since same-sex marriage began to
become available in Massachusetts in 2003, and had become
increasingly available even before Obergefell,59 the number of
marriages represented in Table 1 from 2003 forward included some
same-sex marriages, but the exact numbers for each year are not
known. If all of the unmarried same-sex partners could have and had
gotten married in 2010, an unlikely event, the marriage rate would
have risen sharply, from 0.67% to 0.97%.60 It is predictable that
Obergefell will unleash a degree of pent-up demand and that a

53

See Daphne Lofquist, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Same-Sex Couple Households,
tbl.
1
at
3
(Sept.
2011),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-03.pdf.
54
See Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, supra note 52.
55
See supra notes 39-49.
56
See Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, supra note 52.
57
See Martha M. Ertman, Marital Contracting in a Post-Windsor World, 42
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 479, 482 (2015) (“Heterosexual practices are likely to be the
most accurate predictor of changes in marriage and the legal rules governing it.”).
58
See supra Tables 1 and 2. See also Hunter Schwarz, Married Same-Sex
Couples Make up less than One Half of One Percent of All Married Couples in the
U.S., Sept. 22, 2014, WASH. POST, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/22/married-same-se
x-couples-make-up-less-than-one-half-of-one-percent-of-all-married-couples-in-t
he-u-s/.
59
See Same Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 32.
60
As shown in Table 2, there were 901,997 unmarried same-sex partner
households in 2010. If all the partners had gotten married, there would have been
2,997,997 marriages in a population of 308,745,538 instead of the actual number
of marriages of 2,096,000 (see supra Table 1).
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percentage of unmarried partners will get married in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision.61 If so, the rise in the marriage rate would
likely be a one- or maybe two-year phenomenon and then level off.
Once the pent-up demand has been fulfilled, the marriage habits of
same-sex couples might, over time, turn out to be similar to the
marriage habits of opposite-sex couples: If so, some will get married,
some will break up, and some will continue to cohabit without getting
married.62

61

See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Gay Marriage’s Moment, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2015,
a t
S R
3 ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/opinion/sunday/frank-bruni-gay-marriagesmoment.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=opinion-c-col-right-re
gion&region=opinion-c-col-right-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region&_
r=0.
62
See, e.g., Curtis Sittenfeld, Wedded Bliss for Everyone!, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 2015, at SR8 (“Now that same-sex marriage is legal nationwide, plenty of gay
people won’t get married just because they can, just as plenty of straight people
don’t.”), available electronically under the title Welcome, Everyone, to the Right to
M
a
r
r
y
,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/sunday/welcome-everyone-to-the-r
ight-to-marry.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=Moth-Visible&m
odule=inside-nyt-region&region=inside-nyt-region&WT.nav=inside-nyt-region
&_r=0.
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E. Longer-Term Cohabitations
Longer-term cohabiting couples are far from homogeneous.63 No
one-size-fits-all generalization explains why a certain percentage of
cohabiting couples continue to cohabit without getting married.64 In
some cases, the couple has reached a joint decision not to marry, but

63

For demographic information on cohabiting couples, see William G. Axinn
& Arnold Thornton, The Relationship Between Cohabitation and Divorce:
Selectivity or Causal Relationship, 29 DEMOGRAPHY 357 (1992); Larry L.
Bumpass, What’s Happening to the Family? Interactions Between Demographic
and Institutional Change, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 483 (1990); Larry L. Bumpass,
National Estimates of Cohabitation, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 615 (1989); Larry L.
Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage, Working
Paper No. 5 (Nat’l Survey of Families and Households, 1989); Casey E. Copen et
al., First Premarital Cohabitation in the United States: 2006-2010 Nat’l Survey of
Family Growth, Center for Disease Control, Nat’l Health Statistics Rep. No. 64
(April 4, 2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr064.pdf;
Marcus Dillender, The Death of Marriage? The Effects of New Forms of Legal
Recognition on Marriage Rates in the United States, 51 DEMOGRAPHY 563 (2014);
Catherine T. Kenney & Sara S. Mclanahan, Why Are Cohabiting Relationships
More Violent than Marriages?, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 127 (2006); Lee A. Lillard et al.,
Premarital Cohabitation and Subsequent Marital Dissolution: A Matter of Self
Selection, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 437 (1995); Martin O’Connell & Sarah Feliz, Same-sex
Couple Household Statistics from the 2010 Census, U.S. Bureau of the Census
( S e p t .
2 7 ,
2 0 1 1 ) ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t
http://www.bing.com/search?q=O%27Connell%2C+same-sex+Household+Statis
tics+from+the+2010+Census&qs=n&form=QBRE&pq=o%27connell%2C+sam
e-sex+household+statistics+from+the+2010+census&sc=0-0&sp=-1&sk=&cvid
=7020baa6a68d489eaeefc019df3f6dc0; Pew Research Center, Living Together: The
Economics of Cohabitation (June 27, 2011), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/06/pew-social-trends-cohabitation-06
-2011.pdf; Stephen Reinhold, Reassessing the Link Between Premarital
Cohabitation and Marital Instability, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 719 (2010); James A.
Sweet & Larry L. Bumpass, Disruption of Marital and Cohabitation Relationships:
A Social-Demographic Perspective, Working Paper No. 32 (Nat’l Survey of
Families and Households, 1990); Arland Thornton, Cohabitation and Marriage in
the 1980s, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 497 (1988); Jonathon Vespa, Union Formation in
Later Life: Economic Determinants of Cohabitation and Remarriage Among Older
Adults, 49 DEMOGRAPHY 1103 (2012).
64
See Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1381, 1386-91 (2001); Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal
Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 185-96 (2015);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and
the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, Colum. Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 14-409, at 62-63 (Aug. 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2483430.
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in other cases one wants to get married but the other resists.65 In still
others, economic circumstances may dictate or influence the
outcome.66 Many other factors can play a role as well.67 An
unfortunate feature of some cohabiting couples is that they are at or
below the poverty level:68 “As compared with their married
counterparts, unmarried parents are lower income, less educated,
disproportionately nonwhite, and more likely to have children from
multiple partners.”69 For many of them, they “have not selected their
situation, they have settled for it.”70
Regardless of the reason for the continuation of the cohabitation,
the couple, as unmarried partners, lack marital status and hence the
automatic rights granted to spouses and surviving spouses. As far as
the law is concerned, the partners are complete strangers to one
another.
The rapid rise in cohabitation rates is well documented. Table 2
shows the rise from 5.48 million in 2000 to 7.74 million in 2010.
Earlier estimates by the Census Bureau put the number at about 1
million in 1977, 1.7 million in 1980, and 3 million in 1990. 71
In a survey conducted in 2010, the Pew Research Center found
that public attitudes widely differ by age groups: “Most adults ages
65 and older are critical of these unmarried couples, whether they are
same-sex or opposite-sex couples. Most young adults, ages 18 to 29,
are not.”72

65

See Estin, supra note 64.
See id.
67
See id;
68
See id. at 1388; MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 76 (“Cohabitation
is more common among those of lower educational and income levels.”).
69
Huntington, supra note 64 at 186-87.
70
Ira Mark Ellman, Marital Roles and Declining Marriage Rates, 41 FAM.
L.Q. 455, 485 (2007)
71
See Lynne M. Casper et al., POPULATION DIVISION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
How Does POSSLQ Measure Up? Historical Estimates of Cohabitation, Population
Div. Working Paper No. 36, at tbl. 1, (May 1999), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0036/twps0036.html..
72
Pew: The Decline of Marriage & Rise of New Families, supra note 6, at 64.
66
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Although at the current time, only 9.1% of Americans women age
15 to 44 are cohabiting,73 the percentage is higher at the younger ages.
In the age 20 to 24 category, 15.7% are cohabiting, and in the 25 to
29 year category, the percentage is 12.9.74As might be expected, the
rates are lower for middle-aged and older people: age 30 to 34, 7.9%,
age 35 to 39, 6.7%, and age 40 to 44, 6.6%.75
The most important statistic for spousal-rights law is that for most
people cohabitation is a temporary or short-term state. The parties
either break up or get married fairly quickly. By about one and onehalf years, half the cohabiting couples have either married or broken
up. Only about ten percent remain cohabiting after five years.76 This
does not mean, however, that at any point in time there are only a few
longer-term cohabitations. The longer-term cohabitations tend to
accumulate in the population. More are added every year.

73

See Paula Y. Goodwin et al., CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, Marriage and Cohabitation in the United States: A Statistical
Portrait Based on Cycle 6 (2002) of the National Survey of Family Growth tbl. 1
at 17 ( Vital and Health Statistics Series 23, no. 28, Feb. 2010), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_028.pdf.
74
See id.
75
See id.
76
See Casey E. Copen et al., CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NAT’L CENTER
FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, First Premarital Cohabitation in the United States: 20062010 National Survey of Family Growth, Report No. 64, at 5 (April 4, 2013),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr064.pdf; NAT’L CENTER FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Marriage
and Cohabitation in the United States: A Statistical Portrait Based on Cycle 6
(2002) of the National Survey of Family Growth, at 1 (Series 23 No. 28, Feb.
2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_028.pdf; NAT’L
CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in the United
S ta tes 1 2 ( Ser ies 23 No. 22, July 2002), ava ila b le at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf.
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II. CASE LAW: FROM CONTRACT TO STATUS77
A. Recovery Based on Contract
The longer-term cohabitations are the ones that tend to find their
way into the legal system. Law suits are brought upon disinheritance
at death or, more commonly, the deliberate decision of one of the
parties to terminate the relationship. The unmarried-cohabitors cases
that come to public attention nearly always involve a defendant who
is a wealthy celebrity, entertainer, or professional athlete. But the less
celebrated come to court also. As a Houston divorce attorney once
remarked: “You don’t need millions of dollars for people to fight.
Give two people a house worth $200,000 and they’ll consider an
action.”78
These suits are sometimes grounded on a common-law marriage
claim, but when that claim is unavailable because the state does not
recognize common-law marriages79 or because the arrangement does
not fit within the common-law marriage criteria, the suits can still go
forward as ones for “palimony.”80 Not surprisingly, most of the cases
arise in the context of a dissolution during life. Claims arising at
death are less common because, if the partners remain devoted to one
another, the surviving partner might be provided for in the decedent’s
will or other parts of the estate plan.81 Therefore, it is less usual for

77

Portions of the discussion in Part II draw upon an earlier article: Lawrence
W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21, 61-78
(1994).
78
Gary Taylor, Increased Mobility Adds to Common Law Claims, NAT’L L.J.,
Aug. 14, 1989, at 24. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI inflation
calculator, $200,000 in 1989 would be $385,000 in real dollars in 2015.
79
See infra Part II.B.1.
80
The term “palimony” is misleading, because the plaintiff is usually seeking
a division of the couple’s property, not an award of periodic payments similar to
alimony.
81
In speaking of the power of testation, Jeremy Bentham noted that “a man
should have the means of cultivating the hopes and rewarding the care of ... a
woman who, but for the omission of a ceremony, would be called his widow ....”
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 185-86 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931).
See generally, however, Joseph W. deFuria Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting
from Meretricious Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 200 (1989) (“[Although only] a few courts [raise] a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence ... whenever the testator willed his estate to a
meretricious partner ... [m]any more courts emphasized that such a relationship
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cases to arise in which a surviving partner is making a claim to a
share of a decedent’s estate, but such cases do arise.82
raised a significant suspicion of undue influence, which would be closely
scrutinized.”); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator,
42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (1981) (“[T]here is at least some evidence to suggest that
a homosexual testator who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to his lover stands in
greater risk of having his testamentary plans overturned than does a heterosexual
testator who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to a spouse or lover.”); Jane Birnbaum,
Gay Partners’ Problem: Passing on Their Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1994, at 31
(“Propelled in part by the AIDS epidemic, gay men and lesbians increasingly look
to revocable living trusts as a way to efficiently pass on assets to their partners and
to insure their partners will handle their personal affairs if they become
incapacitated.... Because the trusts generally avoid probate and are unpublished, the
deceased’s family is less likely to intervene than with a will.”); Annot., Existence
of Illicit or Unlawful Relation Between Testator and Beneficiary as Evidence of
Undue Influence, 76 A.L.R.3d 743 (1977).
82
Although most of the cases have involved property disputes between living
cohabitors who have separated, some cases have involved contractual or equitable
claims by the survivor to a share of the other’s estate upon the latter’s death.
Complaints founded upon breach of oral promises supported by social, domestic,
nursing, and business services have been held to state a cause of action. See, e.g.,
Poe v. Estate of Levy, 411 S.2d 253 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing trial court’s
dismissal of count seeking enforcement of an express support contract and count
seeking imposition of a constructive trust in certain property due to a confidential
relationship between surviving cohabitor and decedent, but affirming trial court’s
dismissal of count seeking one-half ownership interest in decedent’s property
grounded on argument that their relationship had the same force and effect as a
legal marriage); Donovan v. Scuderi, 443 A.2d 121 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)
(plaintiff entitled to recover damages for breach of express oral promise to pay to
plaintiff 1,000 shares of stock of the bank of which the decedent was chairman of
the board, in return for which plaintiff made various expenditures and provided
loans and services, including “catering services, personal shopping services,
clothing, furniture and furnishings;” decedent, a married man, and plaintiff, an
unmarried woman, did not have a full-time cohabitation relationship, but frequently
used an apartment plaintiff had obtained at decedent’s request); Tyranski v. Piggins,
205 N.W.2d 595 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (surviving cohabitor entitled to specific
performance of decedent’s oral promise to convey house to her; plaintiff, a married
woman who was separated from her husband, performed various domestic, social,
and nursing services for decedent).
Complaints have also been held to state a cause of action when they sought the
imposition of a constructive trust on specific property based on a confidential
relationship between the cohabitors. See, e.g., Poe, 411 So.2d at 256. Complaints
seeking damages in the amount of the value of such services on the theory of
quantum meruit (as much as the plaintiff deserved) have also been upheld. See, e.g.,
Green v . Richmond, 337 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1975) (surviving cohabitor entitled to
quantum meruit recovery of damages for value of social, domestic, and business
services performed in reliance on decedent’s oral promise to leave a will devising
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Plaintiffs seem to have no problem in stating a cause of action
when they allege that they made a financial contribution toward the
purchase of specific property on the understanding that they would be
the owner or part owner. The fact that the property was not titled in
the plaintiff’s name is not a defense. A cause of action for the
imposition of a purchase-money resulting trust or a constructive trust
on the specific property is well established.83
But what if the plaintiff’s contribution came in the form of
domestic services? The case that has received the most notoriety is
Marvin v. Marvin.84 The Marvin case was one of the first cases to
confront the problem of remedy in a domestic-services case.
The Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment provides
for an equitable remedy in the case of uncompensated contributions
in the form of property or services:
§ 28. Unmarried Cohabitants.... If two persons have formerly lived
together in a relationship resembling marriage, and if one of them
owns a specific asset to which the other has made substantial,
uncompensated contributions in the form of property or services,
the person making such contributions has a claim in restitution

his entire estate to her; Humiston v. Bushnell, 394 A.2d 844 (N.H. 1978) (lack of
proof of alleged oral promise to devise a certain parcel of realty prevented surviving
cohabitor from recovering damages for breach; surviving cohabitor was entitled to
recover in quantum meruit for value of “intimate, confidential, and dedicated
personal and business service” she performed for the decedent with the expectation
of being ultimately compensated therefor); Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697 (Wis.
1980) (surviving cohabitor entitled to recover damages for value of housekeeping,
farming, and nursing services rendered at decedent’s request and with the
expectation of being compensated therefor).
Also, complaints seeking the imposition of an implied partnership with respect
to a business arrangement have been upheld. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton, 499 P.2d
864 (Wash. 1972) (surviving cohabitor entitled to recover on basis of an implied
partnership in cattle-raising business). But the dismissal of a complaint seeking a
half interest in the decedent’s property based on the theory that the parties’
relationship had the same force and effect as a legal marriage was affirmed. See,
e.g., Poe, 411 So.2d at 256.
83
See, e.g., Estate of Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1983) (surviving
cohabitor entitled to constructive trust in her favor of a one-half interest in home
purchased with joint funds but titled in decedent’s name alone).
84
557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
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against the owner as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment upon
the dissolution of the relationship.85

Nevertheless, with respect to domestic services, the Restatement
states that “[c]laims to restitution based purely on domestic services
are less likely to succeed, because services of this character tend to be
classified among the reciprocal contributions normally exchanged
between cohabitants whether married or not.”86
In consequence, unmarried cohabitors who contribute domestic
are entering into a much riskier venture than partners entering into
marriages with similar divisions of labor. Those entering into
marriages with similar divisions of labor have the divorce laws and
the intestacy and elective-share or community-property laws as backup protection. Those entering such a relationship without marriage
have virtually no legal rights to fall back on.
What can they do to protect themselves? One thing they can do is
to insist on protection by contract. The reality is, however, that in
many of the litigated cases, there is a disparity of bargaining power.
By being older and already wealthy, one party is often in a dominant
position. For this reason, and because bargaining is done in the
shadow of one’s legal rights and the unmarried have virtually no
back-up legal rights, the other party is in a “subordinate” position.87
If there is to be a contract, a written contract, as required in two

85

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 (2011).
Section 28 also provides that the rule of this section “may be displaced, modified,
or supplemented by local domestic relations law.”
86
Id. at cmt. d.
87
Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979):
Divorcing parents do not bargain over the division of family wealth and
custodial prerogatives in a vacuum; they bargain in the shadow of the law.
The legal rules governing alimony, child support, marital property, and
custody give each parent certain claims based on what each would get if
the case went to trial. In other words, the outcome that the law will impose
if no agreement is reached gives each parent certain bargaining chips—an
endowment of sorts.
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states, Minnesota and Texas,88 the partner insisting on it is likely to
be the dominant one, not the subordinate one.89 The contract is more
likely to take the form of what one lawyer calls a “Non-Marvinizing”
agreement, under which the subordinate party purports to waive all
rights.90 The subordinate party is likely just as hesitant to raise or
press the subject of a contract as marriage. Subordinate parties who
do press the issue, gently or not, are more likely to get vague oral
statements than a written contract for their effort.
Consequently, the plaintiff in many litigated cases alleges an oral
contract, which in the end may not be provable. The Marvin case fell

88

See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 513.075, .076 (interpreted in Hollom v. Carey,
343 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
26.01(b)(3) (interpreted in Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Ct. App.
1997)).
89
The American Law Institute’s PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 7.01(2)(a), 7.04(1) (2000)
also require a written contract, but PRINCIPLES, unlike the law generally, provides
that domestic partners as defined in § 6.03 have marital-type rights upon dissolution
of the relationship. See id. §§ 6.04 to 6.06.
Premarital and marital agreements must be in writing (see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.4 (2003); UNIF.
PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (2012)), but the requirement is
justified because married partners, unlike unmarried partners, have rights upon
dissolution of the marriage.
90
The lawyer, as reported in JANE BRYANT QUINN, MAKING THE MOST OF
YOUR MONEY 84 (1991), is William P. Cantwell, who served as the Reporter for
the UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT (1983). His “Non-Marvinizing” Agreement,
which would be suitable for parties of equal bargaining power, states:
We have decided to live together beginning on __. We do not intend that
any common law marriage should arise from this. We have not made any
promises to each other about economic matters. We do not intend any
economic rights to arise from our relationship. If in the future we decide
that any promises of an economic nature should exist between us, we will
put them in writing, and only such written promises made by us in a
written memorandum signed by us in the future shall have any force
between us. Signed at __ on __.
Whether the law should treat a document such as this as effective is questionable
without the safeguards of premarital agreements. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note
89, at § 6.01(2) and cmt. b. At a minimum, the law should require evidence of
informed consent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.4 (2003); UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENT
ACT § 9 (2012).
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into this category. The plaintiff, Michelle Triola Marvin,91 brought a
breach of contract action against the defendant, Lee Marvin. Because
the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendant,
the question on appeal was whether the plaintiff’s complaint stated a
cause of action. The California Supreme Court held that it did, but on
remand Michelle could not prove her allegation.
The facts alleged in Michelle’s complaint were that in October of
1964, she and Lee “entered into an oral agreement.” As is typical of
these complaints, Michelle not only listed the domestic services she
agreed to perform but also the opportunities for employment or
training she agreed to forgo. The services she listed were
“companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook.” Michelle’s forgone
opportunities were “her lucrative career as an entertainer [and]
singer.” Lee, in turn, she alleged, not only agreed “to share equally
any and all property accumulated” during the cohabitation92 but also
“to provide for all of [her] financial support and needs for the rest of
her life.”
Michelle and Lee lived together for about five and a half years
(from October 1964 through May 1970).93 During this period, she
alleged, the parties as a result of their efforts and earnings acquired in
Lee’s name substantial real and personal property, including motion
picture rights worth over $1 million. In May 1970, however, Lee (in
the language of the complaint) “compelled” her to leave his
household. He continued to support her for another year and a half
(until November 1971), but thereafter refused to provide further
support.

91

Michelle Triola officially changed her surname to Marvin, even though she
and Lee Marvin never married.
92
Michelle’s actual allegation was that the parties agreed that “they would
combine their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and all property
accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual or combined.” But, since
it appears that the parties contemplated that Michelle would remove herself from
the work force, it appears that it was Lee’s earnings that were to be shared.
93
According to her Wikipedia entry, available at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michelle_Triola_Marvin, Michelle Triola began living
in Malibu with the actor Dick Van Dyke in 1976. She lived with Van Dyke until her
death in 2009 at age 76. They never married. Van Dyke is still living, but Lee
Marvin died at age 63 in 1987.
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In a landmark decision, the California Supreme Court held that
her complaint stated a cause of action. The Marvin decision addressed
two questions. First, is an express contract enforceable, assuming that
it can be proved if oral? Second, if no express contract can be proved,
does the disappointed cohabiting partner have any rights at all?
The principal obstacle to recovering for breach of an express oral
contract, other than the necessity of proving the contract, was what
the courts call the “meretricious” nature of such a relationship—that
the relationship involved sexual activity. Because prostitution is
illegal,94 a contract for prostitution is unenforceable.95 A few postMarvin decisions in other states—Georgia and Illinois—have held
that contracts between unmarried cohabitors are unenforceable for
that reason alone, citing public policy grounds.96 Those decisions are
still presumptively good law in those states.
The Marvin court sought to remove the meretriciousconsideration obstacle to enforcement. The court held that the sexual
component of the arrangement could prevent enforcement only if the
contract was “expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit
consideration of sexual services.”97 This was not the case in Marvin,
for Michelle did not allege that one of the services for which Lee
agreed to pay was for her to be his lover.

94

See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 653.20 to 653.28. For a link to prostitution
laws in all states, see FindLaw.com, State Prostitution Laws, available at
http://statelaws.findlaw.com/criminal-laws/prostitution.html.
95
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1596, 1598.
96
See, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 1977) (“It is well settled that
neither a court of law nor a court of equity will lend its aid to either party to a
contract founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration. Code Ann. § 20-501....
The parties being unmarried and the appellant having admitted the fact of
cohabitation in both verified pleadings, this would constitute immoral consideration
under Code Ann. § 20-501 ...”.); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979)
(“Illinois’ public policy regarding agreements such as the one alleged here was
implemented long ago ...where this court said: ‘An agreement in consideration of
future illicit cohabitation between the plaintiffs is void.’ ... The issue, realistically,
is whether it is appropriate for this court to grant a legal status to a private
arrangement substituting for the institution of marriage sanctioned by the State. The
question whether change is needed in the law... [is best left to] the legislative branch
...”)
97
Marvin, 557 P.2d at 114.
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The time has surely come to put the meretricious-consideration
argument behind us. It is surely time to remove it as an obstacle to
enforcement of these agreements, as the Supreme Court of
Connecticut held in Boland v. Catalano,98 for there is no way these
cases involve agreements for prostitution. Perhaps the Marvin court
thought it had done that by making contracts enforceable unless the
contract was “expressly and inseparably” based upon “sexual
services.” In adopting this as a determining principle, the court may
have been groping for a way to fit domestic partnerships into a
spectrum between contracts for prostitution on the one end and
marriages on the other. Marriages, like cohabiting partnerships,
undeniably involve both a financial and a sexual component. But so
do contracts for prostitution. Perhaps the Marvin court thought that
the distinction between marriage and prostitution was that the sexual
and financial components are express and inseparable in the case of
prostitution, whereas in marriage, the two components are not
expressly dependent upon each other. The existence of these two
components in a marriage is merely inherent in the nature of the
marital relationship. Perhaps the Marvin court concluded that a good
way to liken cohabiting partnerships to marriages and not to contracts
for prostitution was to emphasize the express and inseparable
interdependence of the financial and sexual components in a contract
for prostitution.
A truer distinction between marriage and the typical contract for
prostitution is the existence in marriage of the linking together of two
whole lives, emotionally, financially, and physically, through sharing
the same household in an arrangement involving love, romance,
commitment, caring, and so on. This third component is missing from
a typical contract for prostitution, but it is not missing from a
cohabiting partnership. The Marvin court would have been on
sounder ground if it had distinguished contracts for prostitution from
cohabiting partnerships on this basis rather than on the “express and
inseparable” basis. This approach would have completely removed

98

521 A.2d 142, 146 (Conn. 1987) (“We conclude that our public policy does
not prevent the enforcement of agreements regarding property rights between
unmarried cohabitants in a sexual relationship.”)
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the obstacle of meretricious consideration from enforcement of the
financial component of cohabiting-partnership contracts.
Perhaps the Marvin court thought that the “express and
inseparable” distinction itself eliminated the meretricious
consideration obstacle for all cohabiting partnership cases. If so, it did
not turn out that way. It was easy in Marvin to sever the sexual
component of the parties’ relationship, because Michelle’s complaint
never alleged that one of her “services” was to be Lee’s lover.
Nevertheless, in a subsequent California case, Jones v. Daly,99 the
plaintiff made the mistake of alleging in his complaint that one of the
services he agreed to perform, in addition to domestic services, was
to be the defendant’s “lover.” This proved to be fatal, for the court
held that the complaint did not state a cause of action, citing the
ground that the plaintiff’s “allegations clearly show that plaintiff’s
rendition of sexual services to Daly was an inseparable part of the
consideration for the ‘cohabitors agreement,’ and indeed was the
predominant consideration.” “There is,” the court said, “no severable
portion of the ‘cohabitors agreement’ supported by independent
consideration.”100
The solution came in a still later case, Whorton v. Dillingham.101
The complaint in that case listed mutual sexual promises—that the
plaintiff promised to be the defendant’s “lover” and that the defendant
promised to be the plaintiff’s “lover.” The court held the complaint
stated a cause of action. In a key passage, the court stated that “by
itemizing the mutual promises to engage in sexual activity, [the
plaintiff] has not precluded the trier of fact from finding those
promises are the consideration for each other and independent of the
bargained for consideration for [the plaintiff’s] employment.”102
The Whorton analysis suggests a responsible way around the
problem in a jurisdiction forced to work within the “express and
inseparable” distinction. Even if sexual intimacy is listed in the
complaint on only one side, surely the way to handle these cases is to

99

176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
Id at 134.
101
248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
102
Id. at 409-10.
100
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presume that the sexual component of a cohabitation is always
separable from the other parts of the contract, on the ground—to be
blunt—that the consideration for sex is sex. I do not want to be
understood as saying that the idea that the consideration for sex is sex
is a realistic way of analyzing the complicated emotional, financial,
and physical relationships that exist in a cohabiting partnership,
anymore than I would suggest that this idea is a realistic way of
analyzing those relationships in a marriage. My point is merely that,
in a jurisdiction forced to work under the “express and inseparable”
principle, this is a convenient, though fictitious, way of dealing with
the problem.

B. Recovery Based on Status
1. Common-Law Marriage
Most states have abolished common-law marriage by statute.103
Only ten states and the District of Columbia still recognize the
concept. The ten states are Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, Oklahoma,104 Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and
Utah.105 New Hampshire recognizes common-law marriage, but only
for purposes of intestacy.106 After Obergefell,107 common-law
marriages in these states would be open to same sex couples.
The general elements of common-law marriage are capacity to
enter into a marriage (for example, not being married to someone
103

See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.2. See also UNMARRIED
E QUALITY , Common law Marriage Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.unmarried.org/common-law-marriage-fact-sheet/; NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Common law Marriage by State, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/common-law-marriage.aspx.
104
There is some uncertainty in Oklahoma. See Common-law Marriage Fact
Sheet, supra note 103.
105
Common-law marriages are recognized in the following states only if
created before a certain date: Georgia if created before Jan. 1, 1997 (GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-3.1.1), Idaho if created before Jan. 1, 1996 (IDAHO CODE § 32-201),
Ohio if created before Oct. 19, 1991 (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.12(B)), and
Pennsylvania if created before Jan. 1, 2005 (23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103).
106
“Persons cohabiting and acknowledging each other as husband and wife, and
generally reputed to be such, for the period of 3 years, and until the decease of one
of them, shall thereafter be deemed to have been legally married.” N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 457.39.
107
Obergefell, 576 U.S.___ (June 26, 2015), Slip Opinion No. 14-556.
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else), a present agreement to be married (not an agreement to get
married in the future), cohabitation (but no period of cohabitation is
necessary), and holding out as married to the community.108 Negative
judicial and legislative reaction to the concept of common-law
marriage grew during the late nineteenth century. One criticism of the
concept was that the informality of common-law marriages makes
them highly vulnerable to fraud and perjury. More prominent was the
argument that recognition of common-law marriage undermines
formal marriage.109 One commentator who has studied common-law
marriage has concluded that the fear of fraud does not stand up to
scrutiny and that other objections are outweighed by more important
values, such as the protection of women, especially poor women.110
There is no proof that recognition of common-law marriage
undermines formal marriage: Despite the legal and other advantages
of formal marriage,111 formal marriage is already on the decline and
unmarried cohabitation is on the rise irrespective of whether a state
recognizes or has abolished common-law marriage. The 2010 Census
Bureau Report on Households and Families112 lists—for the whole
country and jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction—the percentage of unmarried
opposite-sex partner households and husband-and-wife households.
The following table shows the results for the country and for the
jurisdictions that recognize common-law marriage. Because each
household self-reports its own identity, the husband-and-wife listings
do not distinguish between formal-marriage households and commonlaw marriage households. If they did, we would know for sure
whether there are below average formal marriages in common-law
marriage jurisdictions and enough common-law marriages to bring
the total roughly up to par. Nevertheless, we can get some clue by
comparing husband-and-wife households with unmarried opposite108

See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common
Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 712-15 (1996).
109
See, e.g., Sorenson v. Sorenson, 100 N.W. 930, 932 (Neb. 1904). See
generally MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985).
110
See Bowman, supra note 108, at 779-80.
111
See supra text accompanying notes 39-49.
112
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Households and Families: 2010 (April 2012),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf.
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sex partner households, on the theory that in common-law marriage
jurisdictions, some couples who had not formally married would
identify their relationship as husband and wife rather than unmarried.
If so, the results should show a consistent pattern in which the
percentage of self-reported husband-and-wife households is above
average and the percentage of unmarried opposite-sex partner
households is below average. The results show no such consistent
pattern. Five of the eleven common-law marriage
jurisdictions—Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah—fit
that pattern but the other six—Alabama, the District of Columbia,
Iowa, Montana, Rhode Island, and South Dakota—do not. Of the
five, Utah is the only jurisdiction that shows a dramatic difference in
result. But the comparative results for one idiosyncratic jurisdiction
fall far short of proving that common-law marriage discourages
formal marriage. While recognition of common-law marriage may
play a part in Utah, other cultural differences probably play a part as
well.113 Overall, there is no consistent pattern showing that
recognition of common-law marriage undermines formal marriage.
Quite the opposite: The results are inconsistent with that proposition.

113

Professor Bowman, supra note 108, at 749-50, explains that the Utah statute
recognizing common-law marriage, which was enacted in 1987, may have been
based on the false premise that it was necessary to prevent couples from excluding
one person’s income when applying for Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
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Table 3
Unmarried Opposite-Sex Partner and Husband-Wife
Households: 2010
United States
and Individual
Jurisdictions
Recognizing Commonlaw Marriage

Opposite Sex
Unmarried Partner
Households as
Percentage of All
Households in that
Jurisdiction114

Self-identified
Husband-Wife
Households as a
Percentage of All
Households in that
Jurisdiction115

United States

5.9

48.4

Alabama

4.1

47.9

Colorado

5.6

49.2

District of Columbia

5.8

22.0

Iowa

6.2

51.2

Kansas

5.3

51.1

Montana

6.1

49.2

Oklahoma

5.3

49.5

Rhode Island

6.7

44.5

South Dakota

6.1

50.1

Texas

5.2

50.6

Utah

3.9

61.0

In some states where common-law marriage has been abolished,
courts have applied a de facto common-law marriage doctrine to
couples who lived together in a common-law marriage state. In
Kellard v. Kellard,116 a New York man and woman, unmarried but

114
115
116

Id. tbl. 6, at 16.
Id. tbl. 4, at 10.
13 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).

-33-

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2015

33

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 123 [2015]

Prepublication Draft: Marital Rights for Unmarried Partners?
cohabiting with one another, took an automobile trip to Disney World
in 1978. During the trip, they stayed overnight in a motel in South
Carolina where they registered as husband and wife, and engaged in
sexual intercourse. They also stayed for two nights in a motel in
Georgia. Some years later, in defense to a divorce suit filed in New
York by the woman, the man claimed that no divorce was necessary
because he was not married to the plaintiff. A New York court
rejected his defense, holding that the couple’s behavior en route to
Disney World satisfied the common-law marriage requirements of
South Carolina and Georgia. This, along with the lengthy history of
the couple’s relationship, led the court to recognize them as
married.117
2. In States That Have Abolished Common-Law Marriage
What if an unmarried cohabitor enters upon a cohabitation
arrangement without contractual protection in a state that has
abolished common-law marriage? In Marvin, Michelle Triola alleged
an oral contract, but a plaintiff who alleges an oral contract has the
burden of proof and she was unable to carry that burden. The courts
in a few jurisdictions have closed the door to plaintiffs without an
express contract118 and at least two state legislatures, Minnesota and

117

See also Gary Taylor, Increased Mobility Adds to Common Law Claims,
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 14, 1989, at 24.
118
See, e.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980); Boland v. Catalano,
521 A.2d 142 (Conn. 1987); Aehegma v. Aehegma, 797 P.2d 74 (Haw. Ct. App.
1990); Estate of Alexander, 445 S.2d 836 (Miss. 1984); Dominguez v. Cruz, 617
P.2d 1322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y.
1980). The Alexander court held that if a remedy is to be given to a surviving
cohabitant in the absence of an express contract, “the Legislature should provide the
remedy.” See also Carries v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(although prior Michigan cases have held that express contracts are enforceable to
the extent they are based on independent consideration, and have enforced contracts
implied in fact for wages or for the value of commercial services, the court in the
instant case was “unwilling to extend equitable principles to the extent plaintiff
would have us do, since recovery based on principles of contracts implied in law
essentially would resurrect the old common-law marriage doctrine which was
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Texas, have closed the door to plaintiffs without an express written
contract.119 The advantage of such a bright-line test, especially the one
that insists on an express written contract, is that it introduces an
element of efficiency into the law in the manner of the Statute of
Frauds and similar to the efficiency accruing from grounding spousal
rights on status. The cohabiting partner with a contract can claim the
contractual rights without having to prove anything about the
underlying details or commitment of the relationship. Just as the
marriage certificate qualifies the spouse for what the law allows, the
written contract qualifies the cohabiting partner-plaintiff for what the
contract allows.
The disadvantage is that plaintiffs with just claims are shut out.
This category includes plaintiffs who are in a “subordinate” position
to the defendant in terms of bargaining power, and hence are unable
to obtain contractual protection.120 More importantly, perhaps, this
category also includes a disproportionate number of plaintiffs who are
unsophisticated in the ways of the law.
To its credit, the court in the Marvin case thought that there would
be cases that warranted relief even without a contract, and there are
cases in which the plaintiff’s claim seems undeniably just. In seeking
to find a way of analyzing this problem, the court in Marvin used an
interesting phrase. The court spoke, and spoke repeatedly, of
enforcing the “reasonable expectations of the parties.” “The courts
may inquire into the conduct of the parties121 to determine whether

specifically abolished by the Legislature.... [J]udicial restraint requires that the
Legislature, rather than the judiciary, is the appropriate forum for addressing the
question raised by plaintiff. We believe a contrary ruling would contravene the
public policy of this state ‘disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property
rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.”’).
119
See supra note 88.
120
See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
121
According to Professor Glendon, the reference to an inquiry into the conduct
of the parties raised “the prospect of litigation in which the private lives of the
parties can be explored in detail [and] has led already to the settlement out of court
of a number of suits by alleged same-sex lovers or clandestine playmates of well-
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that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement
of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding
between the parties,” the court said.
In speaking of the “reasonable expectations of the
parties”—plural—the court was probably knowingly engaging in a
fiction. Few could doubt that the parties in the Marvin case did not
enter or continue the arrangement with the same expectations. Some
interesting empirical research has shown that different expectations
are standard. The study found:
In 39 percent of the cases for which we have couple data, one party
believes they will marry and the other does not! This difference of
perception is surely a factor in the higher instability of these
unions. Another 11 percent agree that they will not get married,
making just about half of all cohabiting couples where there is
disagreement about marriage or no plans to marry. Twenty-nine
percent agree that they have definite plans to marry, and in another
20 percent of the cases one partner has definite plans to marry,
while the other thinks they will marry but does not have definite
plans to do so.122

known people.” See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW
279 (1989).
122
Larry L. Bumpass et al., supra note 63, at 14. See also Ronald R. Rindfuss
& Audrey VandeHenvel, Cohabitation: Precursor to Marriage or an Alternative
to Being Single, 16 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 703, 721 (1990) (empirical study
finding that “cohabitors are substantially more similar [in their attitudes toward
matters such as marriage and childbearing plans] to the singles than to the
married”). A later study, however, found “a fairly high level of consensus” about
marriage plans among heterosexual cohabitors who were age 35 and younger:
Seventy percent of those who report that they have definite plans to marry
their partner live with a partner who reports that they have definite plans
to marry them. An additional 14 percent had partners who thought that
they would marry them. Only about 6 percent had partners who did not
expect to marry them or who did not know whether or not they would
marry.
James A. Sweet & Larry L. Bumpass, Young Adults’ View of Marriage,
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To be sure, this study reports on marriage expectations in shorterterm cohabitations, and the Marvin court’s emphasis was on a
different type of expectation—the expectation that there will be
“profit-sharing.” To be sure, also, the emphasis here is on the longerterm cohabitations, those that are the exception overall but tend to
accumulate in the population. In any event, Lee Marvin and Michelle
Triola, it would probably be safe to speculate, did not share the same
expectations, not even when entering into or during the happy periods
of their arrangement. Michelle probably hoped and maybe even
expected that Lee would eventually marry her or, failing that, that he
would “do right” by her financially. Whether Lee ever intended to do
either is unclear. He certainly determined never to give her a dime
shortly after they broke up.
So, what do we make of the court’s emphasis on “the reasonable
expectations of the parties”? The court could be saying one of two
things. One is that there should be an inquiry into whether the
defendant’s behavior reasonably led the plaintiff to think that he had
the same expectations she did, i.e., whether the defendant led her on.
The other, more significant possibility is that the court is saying that
it will attribute or impute “reasonable” expectations even when they
are fictional regarding one of them.
Although this latter idea came to nothing in the Marvin case
itself,123 some courts, in later cases, have applied this idea. Case
authority has held that committed cohabitation relationships have the

Cohabitation, and Family, Working Paper No. 33, at 5 (Nat’l Survey of Families
and Households, 1990).
123
On remand, Michelle failed to prove the existence of an express or implied
contract, but the trial court awarded her $104,000 for rehabilitation on the ground
of an unspecified equitable theory. On appeal, the judgment granting this award was
reversed for want of a “recognized underlying obligation in law or in equity.”
Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981). See also Taylor v. Polackwich, 194
Cal. Rptr. 8 (1983) (“rehabilitative award” reversed on appeal).
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same force and effect as a legal marriage.124 Many if not all of these
cases involve relationships that would be common-law marriages but
for the abolition of that doctrine. Two examples will suffice.125 The
first is Goode v. Goode,126 a West Virginia case. Carl and Martha
Goode separated after having lived together for twenty-eight years.
Although the couple had never formally married, they had
consistently held themselves out to the public as husband and wife.
They had four children. Martha, age 47, filed a divorce action against
Carl, age 61, seeking an equitable division of the property they had
acquired during their 28-year period of cohabitation. Although West
Virginia is not a common-law marriage state, the court held that
Martha could recover, saying:
[W]e hold that a court may order a division of property acquired by
a man and woman who are unmarried cohabitants, but who have
considered themselves and held themselves out to be husband and
wife. Such order may be based upon principles of contract, either
express or implied, or upon a constructive trust. Factors to be
considered in ordering such a division of property may include: the
purpose, duration, and stability of the relationship and the
expectations of the parties. Provided, however, that if either the
man or woman is validly married to another person during the
period of cohabitation, the property rights of the spouse and
124

For examples of cases providing for equitable division of property acquired
while the couple cohabited before marrying or acquired while the couple cohabited
after having divorced each other, see Eaton v. Johnson, 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
1094 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So.2d 872 (Miss. 1986);
Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995) (applying the principle of
Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1984)).
125
Other post-Marvin cases have asserted claims based on nonfamily doctrines,
such as express contract, contract implied in fact, contract implied in law, quantum
meruit, and constructive trust. See, e.g., Bright v. Kuehl, 650 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995); Western States Construction, Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220 (Nev.
1992); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987). Decisions in many of these
cases are ambiguous as to whether the court based recovery on a contract implied
in fact or on unjust enrichment grounds.
126
396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990).
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support rights of the children of such man or woman shall not in
any way be adversely affected by such division of property.127 The
expectations of the parties under these circumstances would be
equitable treatment by the other party in exchange for engaging in
such a cohabiting relationship.

My second example is a case that goes even farther and allows an
unmarried plaintiff to utilize the divorce laws directly. That case is
Warden v. Warden.128 Charles Warden and Denise Boursier began
living together in 1963, holding themselves out as husband and wife.
They had two children. In 1972, Charles moved to California and
formally married another woman. After learning of this, Denise
brought suit under the divorce laws for child support and an equitable
division of property, which the trial court awarded. Charles appealed
that part of the judgment decreeing a division of the property.
Although Washington is not a common-law marriage state, the
Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, saying:
We believe the time has come for the provision of [the Washington
statute providing for equitable division of property upon
dissolution of a marriage] to govern the disposition of the property
acquired by a man and a woman who have lived together and
established a relationship which is tantamount to a marital family
except for a legal marriage.

127

Under the facts of this case, the parties lived together for an extended period
of time, considered themselves as husband and wife, and, in fact, pooled their
resources to include taking property under three joint deeds. Therefore, in this case,
the equities are more easily determined than in a relationship between two parties
which was for a shorter duration, or where the parties did not consider themselves
to be husband and wife, or where the parties did not pool their resources. Cases in
other jurisdictions have noted that “[e]ach case should be assessed on its own merits
with consideration given to the purpose, duration and stability of the relationship
and the expectations of the parties.” Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (1984).
[Footnote by the court.]
128
676 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). See also Western States
Construction, Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220 (Nev. 1992).
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The trial judge here properly treated Denise and Charles as a
marital family and correctly considered the length and purpose of
their relationship, the two children, the contributions of the parties,
and the future prospects of each. He correctly assumed that both
Denise and Charles contributed to the acquisition of the property
and divided it in a manner which was “just and equitable after
considering all relevant factors.”129

Once the case law grants extra-contractual rights to disappointed
cohabiting partners, the law is granting rights based on “status.”
Unlike marital status, though, each litigated cohabitation must be
probed in order to classify the relationship as a marriage in fact or not
as a marriage in fact to determine whether relief is warranted. Each
plaintiff must prove that the underlying nature of his or her
relationship with the defendant warrants recovery. The extract quoted
from the Warden opinion gives some idea of what must be proved.
Another definition comes from the New York case of Braschi v. Stahl
Associates Co.,130 a case that involved an analogous question under
the New York rent control laws: There must be, the court said:
an objective examination of the relationship of the parties[,
including] the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the
level of emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which
the parties have conducted their everyday lives and held
themselves out to society, and the reliance placed upon one another
for daily family services.... These factors are most helpful,
although it should be emphasized that the presence or absence of
one or more of them is not dispositive since it is the totality of the
relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-

129

Id. at 1039-40. Contra, Crowe v. De Gioia, 495 A.2d 889, 897-98 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), aff’d, 505 A.2d 591 (N.J. 1986) (rejecting plaintiff’s
claim for equitable distribution of defendant’s property).
130
139. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
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sacrifice of the parties which should, in the final analysis,
control.131

III. A UNIFORM DE FACTO MARRIAGE ACT?
Now that same-sex marriage is legal in all American jurisdictions,
many same-sex couples who were previously cohabiting will enter
into a formal marriage. But some will continue to cohabit without
doing so, just as many opposite-sex couples continue to cohabit
without doing so. The time may now be ripe to start thinking about
the rights, if any, of unmarried cohabitors. I addressed this matter
long ago, in my Joseph Trachtman Lecture at the 1992 annual
meeting of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel.132
Other scholars have more recently raised the matter.133
The questions the case law described in Part II leaves us with are
these: Can—and should—we replace the case-by-case, hit-or-miss
adjudication with legislation—a De Facto Marriage Act—that adopts
criteria for determining which cohabiting couples have martial rights
and which do not?

131

Id at 55. See also Mary Patricia Truethart, Adopting a More Realistic
Definition of “Family,” 26 GONZAGA L. REV. 91 (1990/91).
132
See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 18 THE
PROBATE LAWYER 1, 47-66 (1992).
133
See Huntington, supra note 63; Scott & Scott, supra note 63, at 18-19
(arguing that “The fact that the law confers deference and societal resources on
marriage does not mean that the privileged status of this traditional family form
should be exclusive” and noting that “legal benefits are sometimes extended to adult
de facto relationships on the basis of their similarity to marriage,” and, at 65, that
“[s]ome cohabiting couples are clearly in family relationships, and regulators may
be able to employ a few straightforward proxies to minimize verifiability
problems.”); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129
HARV. L. REV. __, __ (forthcoming 2016); Anna Stêpieñ-Sporek & Margaret
Ryznar, The Consequences of Non-Marriages, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. page proofs at 1425 (forthcoming 2015) (canvassing legal treatment of cohabiting couples in
Europe), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2603990; Deborah A. Widiss, NonMarital Families and (or After?) Marriage Equality, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 547
(2015).
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My principal purpose here is, first, to draw attention to the
problem and secondly, to draw attention to the fact that other Englishspeaking jurisdictions have enacted or introduced legislation granting
marital rights to cohabiting couples if their relationship meets specific
criteria. Legislation recognizing marital rights has been enacted or
introduced in Australia,134 Canada,135 New Zealand,136 and the United
Kingdom.137
In this country, the American Law Institute (ALI) has recognized
that longer-term cohabitants have rights similar to married couples
upon dissolution of the relationship.138 Because the ALI put forward
its project as what it calls “Principles of the Law,” which the ALI says
are “primarily addressed to legislatures,”139 I refer to that project as
the “ALI Unmarried Partner Statute.” The ALI, however, is known
for its Restatements of the Law, which are directed to courts, not
legislatures.140 Although the ALI Unmarried Partner Statute has not
been transformed into a bill and introduced in any state legislature,
the explanation may lie elsewhere than on the merits of the proposal.
The ALI is not organized to take any post-publication action to
134

Australia Family Law Act 1975 § 4AA; New South Wales Property
(Relationships) Act 1984 § 4; Northern Territory De Facto Relationships Act 1991
§§ 3A, 10, 24, 28, 52; Queensland Acts Interpretation Act 1954 § 32DA;
Queensland Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003;
Queensland Succession Act 1981 § 5AA.
135
Alberta Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, SA 2002, c. A-4.5, § 3(1);
British Columbia Family Law Act § 3; Ontario Family Law Act § 29.
136
New Zealand Property (Relationships) Act 1976 § 2A - 2E.
137
UK Cohabitation Rights Bill [H.L. Bill 29] 2015-16 (1st reading 4 June
2015); UK Law Comm. Rep. No. 331, 13 Dec. 2011 (Draft Inheritance
(Cohabitants)) Bill (13 Dec. 2011).
138
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.01 to 6.06, app. II, § 5.09 (2000) [hereinafter ALI
UNMARRIED PARTNER STATUTE].
139
See ALI, How Do Principles of the Law Differ from Restatements of the
L a w ? ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t
https://www.ali.org/publications/frequently-asked-questions/#differ.
140
Full disclosure: I have been a Restatement Reporter: Restatement (Third)
of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers (1999, 2003, 2011).
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promote enactment of its Principles Statutes. Moreover, the sections
dealing with unmarried partners is a small part of a much larger
project dealing principally with dissolution of formal
marriages—allocation of custodial and decisionmaking responsibility
for children, child support, division of property upon dissolution,
compensatory spousal payments, and premarital, marital, and
separation agreements.
The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) is the law-reform
organization whose sole purpose is drafting and promoting its
legislation. That makes the ULC the logical organization for studying
the problem of marital rights for cohabiting couples.141 The question
for study is whether a De Facto Marriage Act could and should be
enacted here.142 In studying the problem, the ULC will find helpful
the Commonwealth, ALI, and other sources.143

141

Full disclosure: I have drafted legislation for the ULC and have been Chief
Reporter and Director of Research for the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust
and Estate Acts. I served as Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code Article II
Revisions (promulgated 1990, 1993, 2008, and 2009), the Revised Uniform
Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act (promulgated 1991), the Revised Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act (promulgated 1991), and the Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities (promulgated 1986).
142
See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria
and Procedures for Designation and Consideration of Uniform and Model Acts,
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
a
t
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Criteria%20for%20New%20P
rojects.
143
In addition to the UK and Commonwealth statutes and the ALI Unmarried
Partner Statute, there are numerous Law Revision Commission Reports that support
the idea of de facto marriage. See, e.g., UK Law Comm’n Consultation Paper No.
1
7
9
(
J
u
l
y
2
0
0
7
)
,
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/cp179_Cohabitation_C
onsultation.pdf; UK Law Comm’n, Intestacy and Family Provision Claims on
Death, Rep. No. 331, ¶ 1.99 at 24 (Dec. 2011),
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/lc331_intestacy_report.
pdf; Queensland Law Reform Comm’n, De Facto Relationships, Rep. No. 44 (June
1993); Queensland Law Reform Comm’n, Intestacy Rules, Rep. No. 42 (June
1
9
9
3
)
,
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/lc331_intestacy_report.
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A De Facto Marriage Act would codify the principle that
unmarried partners can gain marital rights and would codify the
criteria for qualifying for such rights. In the case of married partners,
the marriage license, the wedding ceremony, and the marriage
certificate signify intent to acquire the rights of marriage. More
accurately, the marriage laws attribute that intent to married partners,
because it is unlikely that many married partners actually formed that
intent with full knowledge of what those rights are. Cohabiting
couples have none of these official indicia of intent. On what basis,
then, should the law ever declare that cohabiting couples have
become married in fact, i.e., have a de facto marriage? For them, a De
Facto Marriage Act would treat committed behavior occurring over
time as signifying (again, by attribution) intent to acquire the rights
of formal marriage. If a relationship that has been edging toward de
facto marriage continues to progress along that continuum, the
relationship will likely, at some point, cross the line between
cohabitation and marriage in fact. That would be the tipping
point—the time when a court of competent jurisdiction could
justifiably declare the couple’s relationship as having reached marital
status.
How should a De Facto Marriage Act be crafted? On this, the
Commonwealth statutes and other resources have reached a general
consensus. The Act would codify an overriding standard for
determining whether a de facto marriage has occurred and then list
factors for a court to take into account in determining whether that
standard has been satisfied.
The starting point is that the couple must not be married to anyone
else144 and must not be prohibited from marrying one another.
Although some of the Commonwealth statutory standards are more
detailed than others, and different statutes formulate the standard

pdf.
144

The ALI Unmarried Partner Statute departs from this requirement. See ALI
UNMARRIED PARTNER STATUTE, supra note 138, at § 6.01(5) & cmt. c.
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differently, they are all aiming at the same general requirement: the
partner’s behavior must demonstrate enough of a commitment toward
one another to justify declaring that they are married in fact. Some of
the Commonwealth statutes use the term “marriage-like.”145 But that
term is not apt for de facto marriages. If a reference to marital
behavior were to be used, the more apt term would be “idealmarriage-like.” Formal marriages need not, and many would not,
meet the standard for de facto marriages. In addition, some same-sex
cohabitants rights advocates object to the “marriage-like” term.146
Most of the Commonwealth statutes avoid the term. Some use
language such as “living together as a couple on a genuine domestic
basis” or just “living together as a couple.”147 Others use language
such as “a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or
adoptive parents of a child.”148 Some of the statutes require the couple
to have lived together for a certain period of time, such as three or
more years.149 The ALI standard is that the couple must “for a

145

See British Columbia Family Law Act § 3(1)(b); Queensland
Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationship) Act 2003 § 3.
146
See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance:
An Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 27 (1998); Douglas NeJaime, Before
Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship
to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87, 114-125, 154-160 (2014); E. Gary Spitko, An
Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance Rights for Committed
Partners, 81 ORE. L. REV. 255, 327-28 (2002).
147
See Family Law Act 1975 § 4AA(1) (Austl.); New South Wales Property
(Relationships) Act 1984 § 4(1); New Zealand Property (Relationship) Act 1976
§ 2D(1)(b); Queensland Acts Interpretation Act 1954 § 32DA(1); UK Cohabitation
Rights Bill § 2(1)(a).
148
See Ontario Family Law Act § 29(b); Alberta Adult Interdependent
Relationships Act, SA 2002 § 3(1)(a)(ii).
149
See British Columbia Family Law Act § 3(1)(b) (“for a continuous period
of at least 2 years”); Queensland Succession Act 1981 § 5AA(2)(b)(ii) (“for a
continuous period of at least 2 years ending on the decedent’s death”); Ontario
Family Law Act § 29(a) (“continuously for a period of not less than three years”);
UK Cohabitation Rights Bill § 2(2)(d) (“for a continuous period of three years or
more”).
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significant period of time share a primary residence and a life together
as a couple.”150
In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, most of
the Commonwealth statutes and the ALI Unmarried Partner Statute
then provide a list of factors to be taken into account. Two features of
all of the statutory lists are that they are not restrictive, meaning that
factors not on the list can be taken into account, and are not
conjunctive, meaning that not all of the factors have to be present.
Most of the statutes that do not require cohabitation for a certain
period of time list the duration of the cohabitation as a factor to be
considered.151 Most of the statutes list intermingling of finances and
formalizing legal obligations and responsibilities as factors, for
example, whether the couple had a joint checking or other types of
accounts, owned property in joint tenancy, one named the other or
both named each other as beneficiary of life insurance or pension
benefit plans, and so on.152 Many of the statutes list having children
as a factor.153 One of the statutes references a sexual relationship,154

150

ALI UNMARRIED PARTNER STATUTE, supra note 138, § 6.03(1).
See Family Law Act 1975 § 4AA(2)(a) (Austl.); New South Wales Property
(Relationships) Act 1984 § 4(2)(a); Northern Territory De Facto Relationships Act
1991 § 3A(2)(a); Queensland Acts Interpretation Act 1954 § 32DA(2)(b); New
Zealand Property (Relationships) Act 1976 § 2D(a); ALI UNMARRIED PARTNER
STATUTE, supra note 138, at § 6.03(3).
152
See Family Law Act 1975 § 4AA(2)(d) (Austl.); New South Wales Property
(Relationships) Act 1984 § 4(2)(d), (e); Northern Territory De Facto Relationships
Act 1991 § 3A(2)(d), (e); Queensland Acts Interpretation Act 1954 § 32DA(2)(d),
(e); New Zealand Property (Relationships) Act 1976 § 2C(2)(d), (e); ALI
UNMARRIED PARTNER STATUTE, supra note 138, at § 6.03(7)(b).
153
See Family Law Act 1975 § 4AA(2)(h (Austl.)); New South Wales Property
(Relationships) Act 1984 § 4(2)(g); Northern Territory De Facto Relationships Act
1991 § 3A(2)(g); Queensland Acts Interpretation Act 1954 § 32DA(2)(g); New
Zealand Property (Relationships) Act 1976 § 2C(2)(g); ALI UNMARRIED PARTNER
STATUTE, supra note 138, at § 6.03(7)(l). Cf. British Columbia Family Law Act §
3(1)(b)(2) (“A person is a spouse ... if the person ... has a child with the other
person.”).
154
See Family Law Act 1975 § 4AA(2)(c) (Austl.) (“whether a sexual
relationship exists”).
151
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and others take account of the couple’s “reputation and public aspects
of the relationship.”155 Again, all of the statutes are aiming at the
same requirement: whether or not the couple’s behavior demonstrates
enough of a commitment to one another to declare that they have
become married in fact. The statutes list a miscellany of other factors,
such as the performance of household tasks,156 but the foregoing are
the main ones. Intermingling finances, formalizing legal obligations,
and having children together are important factors not only because
they show that the couple had a strong commitment to one another
but also because they are subject to objective evidence.157 These
factors serve another function as well: They protect older widows and
widowers who began cohabiting later in life, especially those who
have adult children by prior marriages, from being caught up in a de
facto marriage against their wishes. Older cohabiting couples will not
have children together and are more likely to keep their finances
separate.158

155
See Family Law Act 1975 § 4AA(2)(i) (Austl.); New South Wales Property
(Relationships) Act 1984 § 4(2)(i); Northern Territory De Facto Relationships Act
1991 § 3A(2)(i); Queensland Acts Interpretation Act 1954 § 32DA(2)(i); New
Zealand Property (Relationships) Act 1976 § 2D(2)(i); ALI UNMARRIED PARTNER
STATUTE, supra note 138, at § 6.03(7)(i).
156
See, e.g., Queensland Acts Interpretation Act 1954 32DA(2)(h).
157
“[C]ohabiting couples pool their funds and share expenses just as married
couples do.” D’Vera Cohn, Pew Research Center, Cohabiting Couples and Their
M o n e y ,
N o v .
2 2 ,
2 0 1 2 ,
a v a i l a b l e
a t
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/22/cohabiting-couples-and-their-money/.
158
See, e.g., Sheri Stritof, Tips for Cohabiting Seniors (“Do not combine your
assets. Keep your bank accounts, brokerage accounts, etc., separate.”), available at
http://marriage.about.com/cs/cohabitation/a/cohabseniors_2.htm.
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Drawing on these Commonwealth, ALI, and other sources,159 as
well as on the case law noted in Part II.B.2, I would like to put
forward for discussion a Draft De Facto Marriage Act:
Draft De Facto Marriage Act
Section 1. [De Facto Marriage; De Facto Spouses;
Consequences.] For purposes of all statutes in this state, two
individuals are married to one another in fact if their relationship
meets the requirements of this section. If so, their marriage is a de
facto marriage and they are de facto spouses. A de facto marriage
has the same status as a formal marriage. The parties to a de facto
marriage are spouses. If one of them dies, the survivor is the
decedent’s surviving spouse.
Section 2. [De Facto Marriage; Requirements.] To be
married de facto, the individuals must (i) be unmarried adults; (ii)
not be prohibited from marrying each other under the law of this
state by reason of a blood relationship; and (iii) must be or have
been sharing a common household in a committed relationship.
Section 3. [Common Household.] For purposes of sections 2
and 5, “sharing a common household” or “shared a common
household” means that the individuals shared the same place to
live, whether or not one or both had other places to live and
whether or not one or both were physically residing somewhere
else at the time in question. The right to occupy the common
household need not have been in both of their names.
Section 4. [Committed Relationship; Factors.] For

purposes of section 2, a “committed relationship” is a

159

See, e.g., Mathew Fawcett, Taking the Middle Path: Recent Swedish
Legislation Grants Minimal Property Rights to Unmarried Cohabitants, 24 FAM.
L.Q. 179 (1990) (reporting on Swedish legislation); Stêpieñ-Sporek & Margaret
Ryznar, supra note 133, (reporting on Polish legislation). The draft De Facto
Marriage Act is adapted from an intestacy statute I proposed long ago in Waggoner,
Marital Property Rights in Transition, supra note 77, 59 MO. L. REV. at 79-80.
Other scholars subsequently built upon that intestacy proposal. See T.P. Gallanis,
Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV. 54, 87-91 (2004); E.
Gary Spitko, supra note 146 at 345-49.
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relationship in which two individuals have chosen to share
one another’s lives in a long-term and intimate relationship of
mutual caring. Although no single factor or set of factors
determines whether a relationship qualifies as committed, the
following factors are among those to be considered:
(1) the purpose, duration, constancy, and degree of
exclusivity of the relationship;
(2) the degree to which the individuals intermingled
their finances, such as by maintaining joint checking, credit
card, or other types of accounts, sharing loan obligations,
sharing a mortgage or lease on the household in which they
lived or on other property, or titling the household in which
they lived in joint tenancy;
(3) the degree to which the individuals formalized
legal obligations, intentions, and responsibilities to one
another, such as one or both naming the other as primary
beneficiary of life insurance or employee benefit plans, as
agent to make health care decisions, or as a significant
beneficiary of a will or trust;
(4) whether the couple shared in parenting a child and
the degree of joint caring and support given the child; and
(5) the degree to which the individuals held
themselves out to others as married or the degree to which the
individuals held themselves out to others as emotionally and
financially committed to one another on a permanent basis.
Section 5. [Presumption.] Two individuals are presumed
to be or have been in a committed relationship if they shared
a common household with their minor child for a continuous
period totaling [four] or more years. A child is “their child” if
the child is treated as their child under the law of this [state].
The presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence.
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The Draft Act is a comprehensive de facto marriage act, not
restricted to dissolution, succession, or any other purpose. Without an
obvious limiting principle that would justify a narrower scope, the
Draft Act proceeds on the basis that committed partners who are
married in fact for one purpose are married in fact for all purposes.160
The Draft uses the term “committed relationship” instead of
“marriage-like relationship.” By necessity, however, the Draft Act
uses the term “de facto marriage.” There is a vast patchwork of state
and federal statutes that grant benefits and impose obligations in cases
of “marriage.” As of 2004, federal law alone had 1138 statutory
provisions that condition benefits, rights, and privileges on
“marriage.”161 It would be a near-impossible task to persuade the
federal and state legislatures to amend all of those statutes to say
“marriage or committed relationship.” Another possibility would be
to propose a general statute providing that wherever a statute uses the
term “marriage” or “spouses,” the term includes committed
relationships as defined in the statute.162 While enacting such a statute
at the state level might be possible, persuading Congress to move on
such a statute would be very difficult. For now, my conclusion is that
if a couple in a committed relationship is to acquire the benefits of
marriage under both state and federal law, the statute has to deem the
couple to “married.”
I noted earlier that the time may come when a couple’s behavior
accumulates enough to reach a tipping point—the time when a court

160

Accord,. Queensland Acts Interpretation Act 1954 § 32DA; UK
Cohabitation Rights Bill.
161
See Letter from General Accounting Office (GAO) to Senator Bill Frist
(Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. An earlier
report found 1049 such statutory provisions. See Letter from GAO to
Representative Henr y Hyde (Jan. 31, 1997), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf. Attached to both letters are lists of
the statutory provisions by section numbers and topics.
162
Although that is the approach in Queensland (see Queensland Acts
Interpretation Act 1954 § 32DA), enacting that approach would be far more
difficult in the federal and state system of the United States.
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of competent jurisdiction could justifiably declare the couple’s
relationship as having reached committed status. The Draft Act,
however, along with the Commonwealth statutes and the ALI
Unmarried Partner Statute, does not, and probably should not, provide
a mechanism for automatically declaring the couple as married in fact
right then. Couples who deliberately decline to marry should not have
their decision overridden. Consequently, the Draft Act is not set up
to be self-executing. A court judgment is required.163 Even though a
court judgment would probably be obtainable at the tipping point, a
cohabiting couple in a harmonious committed relationship would not
likely seek one. If such a couple decided that they want to qualify for
all federal as well as state benefits and obligations of marriage, they
would just get married.
The Draft Act, as it currently stands, is silent regarding whether
a de facto marriage becomes effective on the date of the judgment or
on an earlier date.164 Whether the Draft Act should expressly allow or
prohibit a retroactive judgment or leave the question to the discretion
of the court is debatable. A couple who had reached the tipping point
before the date of the judgment might benefit from a judgment that
they were married ex ante, so that, for example, previous gifts from
one to the other qualified for the federal gift tax marital deduction165
or that previous filings of joint income tax returns166 were lawful.
Failing to file a gift tax return or filing a false income tax return could
expose the couple to civil or criminal penalties.167 Whether a
163

In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967), the Supreme
Court held that the Internal Revenue Service must honor judgments of a state’s
highest court, but it need only give “proper regard” to judgments of lower state
courts.
164
In comparison, the British Columbia Family Law Act § 3(3) provides: “A
relationship ... begins on the date on which they began living together in a marriagelike relationship.”
165
See I.R.C. § 2523.
166
See I.R.C. §§ 1(a), 6013 to 6015. The Internal Revenue Service does not
require proof of marriage from couples filing joint income tax returns.
167

See I.R.C. §§ 6672, 6702, 7203, 7206.
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retroactive de facto marriage judgment would be a defense is not
clear. In a decades-old revenue ruling regarding common-law
marriages, which, so far as it goes, should be equally applicable to de
facto marriages, the Internal Revenue Service was frustratingly
imprecise regarding whether a judgment is even required.168 Surely,
in the case of a de facto marriage claim, the Service would not take
the couple’s word for it or make its own independent determination
regarding such a matter on a case-by-case basis. Here is what the
Service said about common-law marriages:
The marital status of individuals as determined under state law is
recognized in the administration of the Federal income tax laws.
Therefore, if applicable state law recognizes common-law
marriages, the status of individuals living in such relationship that
the state would treat them as husband and wife is, for Federal
income tax purposes, that of husband and wife.
The foregoing position of the Internal Revenue Service with
respect to a common-law marriage is equally applicable in the case
of taxpayers who enter into a common-law marriage in a state
which recognizes such relationship and who later move into a state
in which a ceremony is require to initiate the marital relationship....
Also, for the purpose of filing a joint income tax return under
section 6013(a) of the Code, a common-law wife in a state which

168

Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60. The ruling is unusual, because the
analysis was not based on a statement of facts. A statement of facts would
presumably have indicated whether the couple had obtained a common-law
marriage judgment. In a later ruling recognizing same-sex marriages for federal tax
purposes (Rev. Rul. 2013-17, I.R.B. 2013-38), the Service reaffirmed the 1958
ruling on common-law marriages. The 2013 ruling, however, was as imprecise as
the 1958 ruling regarding whether a common-law marriage judgment is required.
The Service offered only the conclusory description of couples who had “entered
into” or “established” common-law marriages. Anecdotally, a couple of messages
on file with the author posted on the ACTEC list serve dated 10-21-15 from
practitioners in a common-law marriage state (Texas) indicate that the IRS did not
question a federal estate-tax marital deduction claimed on the decedent’s estate tax
return when the return was accompanied by a statement explaining the facts
supporting their marriage at common law.
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recognizes such marriages will be considered to be the taxpayer’s
spouse.

Just as a high percentage of formal marriages eventually
unravel,169 a similar or higher percentage of committed relationships
will also eventually unravel. A couple who amicably break up after
cohabiting in a relationship that could be deemed by a court to be a
de facto marriage would not have a divorce remedy imposed on them.
They would be free to disentangle their relationship without
interference from a court under a de facto marriage act. But if one
partner deprives the other of marital rights to which the other feels
entitled, a de facto marriage act would provide a remedy. If they break
up, the plaintiff would be able to seek alimony170 and a property
settlement171 under the divorce laws.172 If one of them dies, the
plaintiff would be able to seek an intestate or forced share under state
law and an estate tax marital deduction173 under federal law. The
plaintiff would have the burden of persuasion in these cases, except
that the presumption in section 5 of the Draft Act would reverse that
burden regarding the existence of a committed relationship. To
benefit from the presumption, the plaintiff would first have to prove

169

See MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 67 (“The American divorce
rate today is about twice that of 1960, but has declined since hitting its highest point
in our history in the early 1980s. For the average couple marrying for the first time
in recent years, the lifetime probability of divorce or separation now falls between
40 and 50 percent.”).
170
For federal income tax purposes, alimony is ordinary income taxable to the
recipient (I.R.C. § 61(8)) and deductible by the payor (I.R.C. § 215).
171
For federal income tax purposes, no gain or loss is recognized on a transfer
of property incident to a divorce, but the transferee takes the transferor’s adjusted
basis. See I.R.C. § 1041.
172
In refining the Draft Act, consideration should be given to possible
differences in divorce laws and to the handling and possible recharacterization of
separate property as marital property between equitable distribution states and
community property states. See, e.g., ALI UNMARRIED PARTNER STATUTE, supra
note 138, at § 6.04(3) & cmt. b.
173
See I.R.C. § 2056.
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the set of facts that the statute requires as a precondition: that the
couple continuously shared a common household with their minor
child for the requisite number of years. Living together with their
child in a common household for a continuous period is a strong
indication that the couple has crossed the line into de facto
marriage.174 The Draft Act defines “their child” as a child who is
treated as their child by applicable state law. That could be a genetic
or adopted child or a child resulting from assisted reproduction or a
surrogacy arrangement.175 There could be and often would be more
than one such child, of course,176 but one is all the statute requires to
trigger the presumption.
A divorced de facto spouse and a surviving de facto spouse could
also apply for Social Security benefits. A divorced spouse who is
unmarried and age 62 or older is entitled to benefits, but only if the
marriage lasted ten years or longer,177 raising in another context the
question of a retroactive de facto marriage judgment. A surviving
spouse is entitled to retirement benefits as early as age 60 if the
deceased spouse worked long enough under Social Security to have

174

In MERLE H. WEINER, A PARENT-PARTNER STATUS FOR AMERICAN FAMILY
LAW 135 (2015), the author proposes that state law recognize a new “parentpartner” status for married and unmarried couples that automatically begins upon
birth of a common child and terminates when the child reaches the age of majority.
The “parent-partner” status would legally obligate each parent, whether or not
sharing a common household with the other parent: (1) “to render reasonable
assistance if the other parent’s life is endangered;” (2) “not to physically or
psychologically abuse the other parent;” (3) “to engage in ‘relationship work’ at the
transition to parenthood and at the demise of the romantic relationship;” (4) “to act
honestly and fairly when contracting with each other about an aspect of their family
relationship;” and (5) “to ‘give or share,’ so that neither parent would perform an
unfairly disproportionate amount of caregiving for the couple’s child.”
175
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-115 to -122.
176
See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
177
See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Retirement Planner: If You Are
Divorced, available at http://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/divspouse.html.
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received retirement benefits.178 For near or below poverty-line
couples,179 Social Security benefits might be the main asset worth
fighting for.
There is no danger that de facto marriages would replace or
discourage formal marriages, any more than recognition of commonlaw marriages has discouraged formal marriage.180 In the case of
formal marriage, the marriage certificate automatically grants full
marital rights to the married partners. Legislation granting that same
status to unmarried partners would still require case-by-case
adjudication to determine whether the criteria have been satisfied.

IV. CONCLUSION
If the marriage and cohabitation trends continue—downward for
marriage, upward for cohabitation—or even if the trends stabilize at
the current rates or reverse somewhat due to same-sex marriages or
a dramatically improved economy sometime in the future, the lack of
marital rights for committed partners will persist as a problem until
a solution is found. Pressure will grow for a legislative blueprint for
gaining those rights, especially as more and more aggrieved partners
seek a remedy when they break up or when one dies without
benefitting the survivor. Commonwealth countries have already
moved on the subject181 and Parliament in the United Kingdom has
it under active consideration.182 In this country, the ALI has put its
prestige behind a remedy for the breaking-up cases183 and scholars are
now taking notice of the problem.184 A Uniform De Facto Marriage

178

See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Survivors Planner: If You Are the
Worker’s
Widow
or
Widower,
available
at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/planners/survivors/ifyou2.html.
179
See supra note 68-70 and accompanying text.
180
See supra text accompanying notes 111-113 and supra Table 3.
181
See supra notes 134-136.
182
See supra note 137.
183
See supra note 138.
184
See supra note 133.
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Act that grants de facto marriages the same status as formal marriages
would entitle de facto spouses to all marital rights under federal as
well as state laws.185

185

See supra text accompanying notes 39-49.
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